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Abstract
We consider the problem of how societies should be partitioned into
classes if individuals express their views about who should be put with
whom in the same class. A non-bossiness condition makes the social
aggregator dependent only on those cells of the individual partitions
the society members classify themselves in. This information is used
to construct for each pro￿le of views an opinion graph. By means of
natural sovereignty and liberalism requirements, we characterize the
non-bossy aggregators generating partitions in which the social classes
are re￿nements of the connected components in the opinion graph.
JEL Classi￿cation: D71
Keywords: social aggregation, group identity, liberalism, non-bossiness
1 Introduction
In this paper we study the formation of groups or classes from a social choice
perspective. Adapting the framework of Fishburn and Rubinstein (1986), we
consider an environment in which every individual has a view about how the
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1society should be partitioned into classes. A group identity function assigns
then to each pro￿le of views a societal decomposition into classes. In the
aggregation problem considered here the number of classes is thus endoge-
nously determined. This is in contrast to environments in which the number
of social groups is assumed to be ￿xed and their names matter (cf. ˙engelci
and Sanver 2008, Dimitrov et al. 2007, Houy 2007, Kasher and Rubinstein
1997, Miller 2008, Samet and Schmeidler 2003, among others).
The most studied rule in the context of aggregating partitions is the
conjunctive aggregator which classi￿es two individuals in the same social
group if and only if everyone in the society thinks so. This function belongs
to the class of rules characterized by Fishburn and Rubinstein (1986) in the
context of the aggregation of equivalence relations (see also Mirkin 1975,
BarthØlemy et al. 1986, BarthØlemy 1988) and it was recently axiomatized
by Houy (2007) in the context of group identi￿cation. The central axiom
in these characterizations is a binary independence condition requiring the
decision of whether or not two individuals belong to the same social class
to depend only on the individual classi￿cations with respect to these two
individuals.
By contrast, the central condition considered here is a non-bossiness con-
dition which requires the group identity function to depend only on one cell
from the individual partition of each society member - namely on the cell
the corresponding individual classi￿es himself in. Intuitively, non-bossiness
thus states that the decision of whether or not two individuals belong to
the same class should not depend on the view of unconcerned individuals.
Non-bossiness neither implies nor is implied by binary independence.
The non-bossiness condition allows one to describe the social classi￿cation
in terms of an opinion graph on the set of individuals. An edge ij in this graph
corresponds to the situation in which either individual i classi￿es himself in
the same group with j or individual j classi￿es himself in the same group
with i. The group identity functions we introduce in this paper correspond to
2particular ways of decomposing this graph. Speci￿cally, any group identity
function satisfying a positive liberalism condition and a simple sovereignty
requirement decomposes the graph into special re￿nements of its connected
components. Having described the set of admissible partitions from which
such a group identity function selects the societal classi￿cation, we then
provide characterizations of two non-bossy rules generating the coarsest and
the ￿nest partition in the admissible set, respectively.
2 Basic de￿nitions and notation
The society is denoted by N, N = f1;:::;ng, and ￿ is the set of all partitions
of N. Recall that a partition of N is a collection of non-empty, pairwise
disjoint subsets of N whose union is N. We call these subsets groups or
classes. A partition ￿ is said to re￿ne another partition ￿0, denoted ￿ ￿ ￿0,
if every group from ￿ is contained in some group from ￿0; we also say in this
case that ￿0 is coarser than ￿. The re￿nement relation is a partial ordering
on ￿.
For each i 2 N, individual i￿ s view is ￿i 2 ￿. Moreover, for each j 2 N,
we denote by ￿i




5 = f2;3;5g 2 ￿1 then, according to individual 1,
individuals 2, 3, and 5 should belong to the same social group. A pro￿le
of individual views is denoted by ￿ := (￿1;:::;￿n) 2 ￿N. For i 2 N and
￿0i 2 ￿, we write (￿￿i;￿0i) to denote the pro￿le at which i￿ s view ￿i is
replaced by ￿0i.
A group identity function is a mapping f : ￿N ! ￿ which assigns to each
pro￿le ￿ 2 ￿N of individual views a partition f (￿) 2 ￿ of the society into
social groups. For all i 2 N, f (￿)i is the social group to which individual i
belongs according to f.
For any i 2 N and ￿i 2 ￿, denote by ￿i 2 ￿ any partition such that
3￿i
i = ￿i
i. That is, ￿i and ￿i may di⁄er only with respect to the cells individual
i does not belong to.
Non-Bossiness (NB): A group identity function f satis￿es Non-Bossiness




Non-bossiness thus requires that an individual can in￿ uence the social
classi￿cation only via his individual opinion about the social group he himself
belongs to.1
Note that Fishburn and Rubinstein￿ s conjunctive aggregator does not
satisfy NB. To see this, take ￿ 2 ￿N to be such that f1;2g 2 ￿i for all
i 2 N. Further, for some j 2 N n f1;2g, let ￿j be such that f1g;f2g 2 ￿j.
Then, the conjunctive aggregator classi￿es 1 and 2 together if the pro￿le is
￿, while 1 is classi￿ed as being single if the pro￿le is
￿
￿￿j;￿j￿
; thus, NB is
violated.
As is easily shown by repeated application of NB, the non-bossiness con-
dition restricts a group identity function to depend only on the individual
views with respect to the groups the corresponding individuals themselves
belong to:
Fact A group identity function f satis￿es NB if and only if f (￿) = f (￿0)
for all ￿;￿0 2 ￿N with ￿i
i = ￿0i
i for all i 2 N.
This fact allows us to describe the social classi￿cation in terms of an
underlying ￿opinion graph￿ . Recall that a graph H = (V;E) consists of a set
of vertices V and a set E of subsets of V of size 2. Thus, kk0 2 E represents
the edge connecting the vertices k;k0 2 V . A path (k1;k2;:::;km) in H is
a sequence of vertices k1;k2;:::;km 2 V for some positive integer m such
that k‘k‘+1 2 E for each 1 ￿ ‘ ￿ m ￿ 1, and we say that (k1;k2;:::;km) is
1 Our condition is closely related to, but not a literal adaptation of, the non-bossiness
condition introduced by Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein (1981) in the context of social
choice functions.
4a path between k1 and km. Let X ￿ V . We say that X is connected if, for
every i;j 2 X, there is a path between i and j which contains only vertices
belonging to X. We say that X is a connected component if X is connected
and, for all Y ￿ V which properly contain X, Y is not connected.
To describe the decompositions we study in the next section, we construct
an opinion graph H￿
￿ for each ￿ 2 ￿N, where its set of vertices is N and
its set of edges is fij : i 6= j; i 2 ￿
j
j or j 2 ￿i
ig. The group identity
functions presented in this paper assign to each pro￿le of individual views
special re￿nements of the connected components in H￿
￿.
3 4






Figure 1: A six-member society
Figure 1 depicts a society consisting of six individuals where, for each
i;j 2 f1;:::;6g, there is an arrow from i to j if and only if j 2 ￿i
i. Thus, given
the above de￿nition of the opinion graph, H￿
￿ has set of edges f12;23;34;45g
and two connected components - f1;2;3;4;5g and f6g.
3 Connected components and their
re￿nements
We consider now two appealing axioms and describe ￿rst the set of admissi-
ble partitions from which any group identity function that satis￿es the two
axioms selects the societal classi￿cation. We then provide characterizations
5of two non-bossy rules generating the coarsest and the ￿nest partition in the
admissible set, respectively.
The ￿rst axiom has a liberal ￿ avor and states that the aggregator puts
two individuals in the same social group provided that both individuals think
that they belong together (cf. Houy 2007).
Weak Positive Liberalism (WPL): A group identity function f satis￿es
Weak Positive Liberalism i⁄for every pro￿le ￿ 2 ￿N and all i;j 2 N, i 2 ￿
j
j
and j 2 ￿i
i imply f (￿)i = f (￿)j.
In order to explain our next axiom, Negative Group Sovereignty, imagine
a situation in which the society N is partitioned into two non-empty subsets
N1 and N2. Consider the case in which every individual in N1 thinks that
he belongs in the same group with individuals only from N1 and that every
individual in N2 puts himself in the same group with individuals only from
N2. Then, it seems reasonable to require that an aggregator should not
classify an individual from N1 and a second one from N2 as being members
of the same social group.
Negative Group Sovereignty (NGS): A group identity function f satis￿es
Negative Group Sovereignty i⁄ for every pro￿le ￿ 2 ￿N and for any two




j ￿ N2 for all i 2 N1 and all j 2 N2 imply f (￿)i 6= f (￿)j for all i 2 N1
and all j 2 N2.
As we show next, a group identity function satisfying WPL and NGS
necessarily selects, for each ￿ 2 ￿N, a partition f (￿) from the set R(￿) we
introduce now.
The coarsest partition contained in R(￿) is ￿￿ (￿), the partition of N
into connected components in H￿
￿. The ￿nest partition included in R(￿)
replaces each D 2 ￿￿ (￿) by its ￿nest partition ￿D = fD1;:::;DKg for which
the following condition is satis￿ed: for all k 2 f1;:::;Kg and all i 2 Dk and
j 2 D, we have that j 2 ￿i
i and i 2 ￿
j
j imply j 2 Dk.
6The set R(￿) is then de￿ned as follows:
R(￿) =
n








Thus, each social class in every partition ￿ in R(￿) belongs to a re￿ne-
ment of fDg and to a coarsening of
￿
￿D￿
for some connected component D
in H￿
￿.
Let us have a look again at Fig. 1 and describe the way the correspond-
ing axioms restrict the decomposition of the depicted society. First, by NGS,
the sixth individual cannot be grouped in the same class with any other in-
dividual. Second, by WPL, the following individuals have to be classi￿ed
together: 1, 2, and 3; and 4 and 5. Hence, the coarsest partition com-
patible with these restrictions is ff1;2;3;4;5g;f6gg, while the ￿nest one is
ff1;2;3g;f4;5g;f6gg. These are also the members of the set R(￿) for the
problem considered in Fig. 1.
Proposition 1 A group identity function f satis￿es WPL and NGS if and
only if f (￿) 2 R(￿) for all ￿ 2 ￿N. Moreover, the two axioms are inde-
pendent.
Proof. Let f be such that f (￿) 2 R(￿) for all ￿ 2 ￿N. Notice then that
f satis￿es WPL as, for all ￿ 2 ￿N, any partition in R(￿) classi￿es in the
same group any two individuals i and j with i 2 ￿
j
j and j 2 ￿i
i. Suppose
now that f violates NGS. This implies that there is some pro￿le ￿0 2 ￿N




j ￿ N2 for all i 2 N1 and all j 2 N2 such that f (￿0)k1 = f (￿0)k2
for some k1 2 N1 and k2 2 N2. Notice that we have in such a case a direct
contradiction to f (￿0) 2 R(￿0).
Consider now a group identity function f which satis￿es WPL and NGS,
and take ￿ 2 ￿N. In what follows we show that f (￿) = 2 R(￿) leads to a
contradiction.
(1) Consider ￿rst the case in which there is D0 2 f (￿) that strictly
contains some D 2 ￿￿ (￿) (and thus, jD0j ￿ 2). De￿ne then N1 := D and
7N2 := N n D and note that both sets are non-empty. Let k 2 D = N1 and
k0 2 D0 n D ￿ N2. Since D 2 ￿￿ (￿), we have ￿i
i ￿ N1 for all i 2 N1 and
￿
j
j ￿ N2 for all j 2 N2. Hence, by NGS, we should have f (￿)k 6= f (￿)k0 in
contradiction to f (￿)k = f (￿)k0 = D0.
(2) We show next that it is impossible for f (￿) to contain a social class




contained in R(￿). If this were the case, there would exist groups D0, D00
and D000 s.t. D0 ￿ D00 2 ￿D000 and D0 2 f (￿). However, this would imply




i. By WPL, f (￿)i = f (￿)j in contradiction to f (￿)i = D0 and j = 2 D0.
(3) Notice ￿nally that, by the same argument as in (1) and by NGS, it
impossible to have a class in f (￿) which contains members from two di⁄erent
groups from ￿￿ (￿).
We conclude that f (￿) 2 R(￿).
In order to show the independence of the axioms, let us consider the
following two rules. Each rule satis￿es one of the axioms but not the other
one. Moreover, for each of these rules, there is a pro￿le ￿ 2 ￿N s.t. f (￿) = 2
R(￿).
(not WPL) Take the aggregator f0 de￿ned as follows: for all ￿ 2 ￿N,
f0 (￿) = f￿Ng, where ￿N denotes the partition of N into singletons. This
aggregator clearly violates WPL while satisfying NGS. We have for this rule
that f00 (fNg;:::;fNg) = 2 R(fNg;:::;fNg) = ffNgg.
(not NGS) Consider the aggregator f00 de￿ned as follows: for all ￿ 2 ￿N,
f00 (￿) = fNg. This rule satis￿es WPL but not NGS, and we have in addition
that f00 (￿N;:::;￿N) = 2 R(￿N;:::;￿N) = f￿Ng.
This completes the proof.
Let us now consider the following stronger version of the WPL axiom
(cf. Houy 2007).
8Positive Liberalism (PL): A group identity function f satis￿es Positive
Liberalism i⁄ for every pro￿le ￿ 2 ￿N and all i;j 2 N, i 2 ￿
j
j implies
f (￿)i = f (￿)j.
Clearly, WPL is implied by PL in which the wish of one of the individu-
als i and j su¢ ces to put them in the same social group. Imposing both PL
and NGS on a group identity function has two implications: ￿rst, any such
function is non-bossy as well (Lemma 1); second, these two axioms charac-
terize the aggregation rule f￿ de￿ned by f￿ (￿) = ￿￿ (￿) for all ￿ 2 ￿N
(Proposition 1). In other words, f￿ selects the coarsest partition in R(￿)
for all ￿ 2 ￿N. For the special case from Fig. 1, one has as the unique
decomposition the partition ff1;2;3;4;5g;f6gg.
Lemma 1 If a group identity function f satis￿es PL and NGS, then it also
satis￿es NB.
Proof. Let f satisfy PL and NGS, and take ￿ 2 ￿N. By PL, the mem-
bers of a connected component in H￿
￿ belong to the same group. By the
repeated application of NGS, there are no members of di⁄erent connected
components in H￿
￿ who are classi￿ed in the same social group by f. Hence,
f (￿) = ￿￿ (￿). Notice ￿nally that H￿
￿ = H￿
(￿￿i;￿i) for all i 2 N and all
￿i 2 ￿. We conclude that f (￿) = ￿￿ (￿) = f
￿
￿￿i;￿i￿
for all i 2 N, all
￿ 2 ￿N, and all ￿i 2 ￿ as required by NB.
Proposition 2 A group identity function f satis￿es PL and NGS if and only
if f = f￿. Moreover, the two axioms are independent.
Proof. The characterization follows from Lemma 1 and the fact that f￿
satis￿es the two axioms. Moreover, the aggregators f0 and f00 constructed in
the proof of Proposition 1 serve also as examples for the independence of PL
and NGS, respectively.
Let us now keep the WPL axiom and strengthen the NGS axiom by
transforming it into the following one.
9Negative Group Liberalism (NGL): A group identity function f satis￿es
Negative Group Liberalism i⁄ for every pro￿le ￿ 2 ￿N and for any two
disjoint subsets N1 and N2 of N with N = N1 [ N2 we have that ￿i
i \
￿




￿ N1 for all i;j 2 N1 and ￿i
i \
￿




￿ N2 for all i;j 2 N2
imply f (￿)i 6= f (￿)j for all i 2 N1 and all j 2 N2.
The axiom requires that if no individuals i 2 N1 and j 2 N2 ever clas-
sify each other to belong to the same group, then the aggregator never
puts an individual from N1 together with one from N2 in a social group.
Again, imposing both WPL and NGP on a group identity function has
two implications: ￿rst, any such function is non-bossy as well (Lemma 2);




D2￿￿(￿). In other words, the aggregator f￿ selects the ￿nest
partition in R(￿) for all ￿ 2 ￿N. For instance, in Fig. 1, f￿ selects the
partition ff1;2;3g;f4;5g;f6gg.
Lemma 2 If a group identity function satis￿es WPL and NGL, then it also
satis￿es NB.
Proof. The proof is similar to the one of Lemma 1 by noticing that by WPL
any two individuals who classify each other in the same group are classi￿ed
together by f, and that by the repeated application of NGL any two indi-
viduals who do not classify each other in same group are not classi￿ed in the
same group by f either.
Proposition 3 A group identity function f satis￿es WPL and NGL if and
only if f = f￿. Moreover, the two axioms are independent.
Proof. The characterization follows from Lemma 2 and the fact that f￿
satis￿es the two axioms. As for the independence of the axioms, notice that
the rule partitioning the society into singletons satis￿es NGL but not WPL,
while the aggregator f￿ characterized in Proposition 2 satis￿es WPL but not
NGL.
104 Discussion and conclusion
This paper is devoted to the study of group identi￿cation problems in which
the decision of whether or not two individuals belong to the same class does
not depend on the view of unconcerned individuals. In this setup, a graph
representation of the individual views allowed us to introduce new group
identity functions and to characterize them in terms of appropriate (positive)
liberalism and (negative) sovereignty axioms. It is worth noting that the two
group identity functions characterized above are anonymous in the sense














where ￿(￿) is the partition that results from permuting the partition ￿ ac-
cording to ￿.
It is natural to ask whether similar results can be obtained if one replaces
the positive liberalism axiom by its negative counterpart and the negative
sovereignty condition by its positive counterpart. Somewhat surprisingly,
the answer is, no! Speci￿cally, consider the following negative liberalism
axiom introduced in Houy (2007). It requires that two individuals belong to
di⁄erent social groups if at least one of them thinks so.2
Negative Liberalism (NL): A group identity function f satis￿es Negative
Liberalism i⁄ for every pro￿le ￿ 2 ￿N and all i;j 2 N, i = 2 ￿
j
j implies
f (￿)i 6= f (￿)j.
As is easily seen, all social groups generated by any group identity function
satisfying NL must form a clique as two individuals are put in the same social
group only if they classify each other in the given pro￿le as members of the
same class. Formally, given a pro￿le of individual partitions, a clique is a
2 It is also easily seen that NL and WPL cannot be jointly satis￿ed by a group identity
function, cf. Houy (2007).
11subset D ￿ N such that for all i;j 2 D, j 2 ￿i
i. A trivial way to satisfy NL is
to let the group identity function always select the partition into singletons,
i.e., to never put two di⁄erent individuals in the same group. The following
condition represents a minimal requirement that prevents this; it can be seen
as a positive counterpart of condition NGS.
Positive Group Sovereignty (PGS): A group identity function f satis￿es
Positive Group Sovereignty i⁄for no pro￿le ￿ 2 ￿N there exist j and k such
that j 62 f(￿)k and fjg [ f(￿)k ￿ ￿i
i for all i 2 fjg [ f(￿)k.
Thus, PGS requires that the societal classi￿cation should not allow a
situation in which an individual thinks he belongs to every single individual
of a social group he is not a member of if all members of this group think they
belong to this individual and moreover to any other member of the group.
As is easily veri￿ed, PGS and NL jointly imply that the societal classi￿cation
generated at any pro￿le of individual views consists of maximal cliques. This
implies that NL and PGS are incompatible with anonymity if n ￿ 3. To
see this, consider a three-person society and a pro￿le ￿ with ￿1
1 = f1;2g,
￿2
2 = f1;2;3g, ￿3
3 = f2;3g. For any group identity function f satisfying
NL and PGS one has f (￿) 2 fff1;2g;f3gg;ff1g;f2;3ggg. Each selection,
however, violates anonymity as can be seen by considering the permutation
that exchanges individuals 1 and 3. The same example also shows that the
negative conclusion of the non-existence of an anonymous group identity
function (satisfying PGS) remains valid if NL is weakened to the negative
counterpart of WPL by only requiring that two individuals should belong to
di⁄erent social groups if both of them think so.
Finally, we note that, unlike their counterparts in Section 3 above, con-
ditions NL and PGS do not imply the non-bossiness condition NB. To verify
this, consider a situation where there are di⁄erent partitions into maximal
cliques, for instance in the situation of Fig. 1 above these are the parti-
tions ￿ = ff1;2g;f3g;f4;5g;f6gg and ￿0 = ff1g;f2;3g;f4;5g;f6gg. De￿ne
12a group identity function f as follows: f selects ￿ if the individual views
w.r.t. their own classi￿cation are as shown in Fig. 1 and individual 6 thinks
that individuals 1 and 2 belong together, f selects ￿0 if the individual views
w.r.t. their own classi￿cation are as shown in Fig. 1 and individual 6 does not
think that individuals 1 and 2 belong together, and f selects some partition
into maximal cliques in any other case. Clearly, f then satis￿es NL and PGS
but violates non-bossiness.
References
[1] BarthØlemy, J.P. (1988): Comments on: Aggregation of equivalence re-
lations by P.C. Fishburn and A. Rubinstein, Journal of Classi￿cation 5,
85￿ 87.
[2] BarthØlemy, J.P., B. Leclerc, and B. Montjardet (1986): On the use of
ordered sets in problems of comparison and consensus of classi￿cations,
Journal of Classi￿cation 3, 187￿ 224.
[3] ˙engelci, M. and R. Sanver (2008): Simple collective identity functions,
Theory and Decision, forthcoming.
[4] Dimitrov, D., S.-C. Sung, and Y. Xu (2007): Procedural group identi￿-
cation, Mathematical Social Sciences 54, 137-146.
[5] Fishburn, P.C. and A. Rubinstein (1986): Aggregation of equivalence
relations, Journal of Classi￿cation 3, 61-65.
[6] Houy, N. (2007): ￿I want to be a J!￿ : Liberalism in group identi￿cation
problems, Mathematical Social Sciences 54, 59-70.
13[7] Kasher, A. and A. Rubinstein (1997): On the question ￿Who is a J?￿
A social choice approach, Logique et Analyse 160, 385-395.
[8] Miller, A. (2008): Group identi￿cation, Games and Economic Behavior
63, 188-202.
[9] Mirkin, B. (1975): On the problem of reconciling partitions, in: Blalock,
H.M., A. Aganbegian, F.M. Borodkin, R. Boudon, V. Capecchi (Eds.),
Quantitative Sociology, International Perspectives on Mathematical and
Statistical Modelling. Academic Press, New York, pp. 441-449.
[10] Satterthwaite, M. and H. Sonnenschein (1981): Strategy-proof alloca-
tion mechanisms at di⁄erentiable points, Review of Economic Studies
48, 587-598.
[11] Samet, D. and D. Schmeidler (2003): Between liberalism and democracy,
Journal of Economic Theory 110, 213-233.
14NOTE DI LAVORO DELLA FONDAZIONE ENI ENRICO MATTEI 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Paper Series 











NOTE DI LAVORO PUBLISHED IN 2009 
SD  1.2009  Michael Hoel: Bush Meets Hotelling: Effects of Improved Renewable Energy Technology on Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions 
SD  2.2009  Abay Mulatu, Reyer Gerlagh, Dan Rigby and Ada Wossink: Environmental Regulation and Industry Location
SD  3.2009  Anna Alberini, Stefania Tonin and Margherita Turvani: Rates of Time Preferences for Saving Lives in the 
Hazardous Waste Site Context 
SD  4.2009  Elena Ojea, Paulo A.L.D. Nunes and Maria Loureiro: Mapping of Forest Biodiversity Values: A Plural 
Perspective 
SD  5.2009  Xavier Pautrel : Macroeconomic Implications of Demography for the Environment: A Life-Cycle Perspective 
IM  6.2009  Andrew Ellul, Marco Pagano and Fausto Panunzi: Inheritance Law and Investment in Family Firms 
IM  7.2009  Luigi Zingales: The Future of Securities Regulation 
SD  8.2009  Carlo Carraro, Emanuele Massetti and Lea Nicita: How Does Climate Policy Affect Technical Change? An 
Analysis of the Direction and Pace of Technical Progress in a Climate-Economy Model 
SD  9.2009  William K. Jaeger: The Welfare Effects of Environmental Taxation 
SD  10.2009  Aude Pommeret and Fabien Prieur: Double Irreversibility and Environmental Policy Design 
SD  11.2009  Massimiliano Mazzanti and Anna Montini: Regional and Sector Environmental Efficiency Empirical Evidence 
from Structural Shift-share Analysis of NAMEA data 
SD  12.2009  A. Chiabai, C. M. Travisi, H. Ding, A. Markandya and P.A.L.D Nunes: Economic Valuation of Forest 
Ecosystem Services: Methodology and Monetary Estimates 
SD  13.2009  Andrea Bigano, Mariaester Cassinelli, Fabio Sferra, Lisa Guarrera, Sohbet Karbuz, Manfred Hafner, Anil 
Markandya and Ståle Navrud: The External Cost of European Crude Oil Imports 
SD  14.2009  Valentina Bosetti, Carlo Carraro, Romain Duval, Alessandra Sgobbi and Massimo Tavoni: The Role of R&D 
and Technology Diffusion in Climate Change Mitigation: New Perspectives Using the Witch Model 
IM  15.2009  Andrea Beltratti, Marianna Caccavaio and Bernardo Bortolotti: Stock Prices in a Speculative Market: The 
Chinese Split-Share Reform 
GC  16.2009  Angelo Antoci, Fabio Sabatini and Mauro Sodini: The Fragility of Social Capital  
SD  17.2009  Alexander Golub, Sabine Fuss, Jana Szolgayova and Michael Obersteiner:  Effects of Low-cost Offsets on 
Energy Investment – New Perspectives on REDD – 
SD  18.2009  Enrica De Cian: Factor-Augmenting Technical Change: An Empirical Assessment 
SD  19.2009  Irene Valsecchi: Non-Uniqueness of Equilibria in One-Shot Games of Strategic Communication 
SD  20.2009  Dimitra Vouvaki and Anastasios Xeapapadeas: Total Factor Productivity Growth when Factors of Production 
Generate Environmental Externalities 
SD  21.2009  Giulia Macagno, Maria Loureiro, Paulo A.L.D. Nunes and Richard Tol: Assessing the Impact of Biodiversity 
on Tourism Flows: A model for Tourist Behaviour and its Policy Implications 
IM  22.2009  Bernardo Bortolotti, Veljko Fotak, William Megginson and William Miracky: Sovereign Wealth Fund 
Investment Patterns and Performance 
IM  23.2009  Cesare Dosi and Michele Moretto: Auctioning Monopoly Franchises: Award Criteria and Service Launch 
Requirements 
SD  24.2009  Andrea Bastianin: Modelling Asymmetric Dependence Using Copula Functions: An application to Value-at-
Risk in the Energy Sector 
IM  25.2009  Shai Bernstein,  Josh Lerner and Antoinette Schoar: The Investment Strategies of Sovereign Wealth Funds 
SD  26.2009  Marc Germain, Henry Tulkens and Alphonse Magnus: Dynamic Core-Theoretic Cooperation in a Two-
Dimensional International Environmental Model 
IM  27.2009  Frank Partnoy: Overdependence on Credit Ratings Was a Primary Cause of the Crisis 
SD  28.2009  Frank H. Page Jr and Myrna H. Wooders (lxxxv): Endogenous Network Dynamics 
SD  29.2009  Caterina Calsamiglia, Guillaume Haeringer and Flip Klijnb (lxxxv): Constrained School Choice: An 
Experimental Study 
SD  30.2009  Gilles Grandjean, Ana Mauleon and Vincent Vannetelbosch (lxxxv): Connections Among Farsighted Agents 
SD  31.2009  Antonio Nicoló and Carmelo Rodríguez Álvarez (lxxxv): Feasibility Constraints and Protective Behavior in
Efficient Kidney Exchange 
SD 32.2009  Rahmi İlkiliç (lxxxv): Cournot Competition on a Network of Markets and Firms 
SD  33.2009  Luca Dall'Asta, Paolo Pin and Abolfazl Ramezanpour (lxxxv): Optimal Equilibria of the Best Shot Game 
SD  34.2009  Edoardo Gallo (lxxxv): Small World Networks with Segregation Patterns and Brokers 
SD  35.2009  Benjamin Golub and Matthew O. Jackson  (lxxxv): How Homophily Affects Learning and Diffusion in 
Networks SD  36.2009  Markus Kinateder (lxxxv): Team Formation in a Network 
SD  37.2009  Constanza Fosco and Friederike Mengel (lxxxv): Cooperation through Imitation and Exclusion in Networks 
SD  38.2009  Berno Buechel and Tim Hellmann (lxxxv): Under-connected and Over-connected Networks 
SD  39.2009  Alexey Kushnir (lxxxv): Matching Markets with Signals 
SD  40.2009  Alessandro Tavoni (lxxxv): Incorporating Fairness Motives into the Impulse Balance Equilibrium and Quantal 
Response Equilibrium Concepts: An Application to 2x2 Games 
SD  41.2009  Steven J. Brams and D. Marc Kilgour (lxxxv): Kingmakers and Leaders in Coalition Formation 
SD  42.2009  Dotan Persitz (lxxxv): Power in the Heterogeneous Connections Model: The Emergence of Core-Periphery 
Networks 
SD  43.2009  Fabio Eboli, Ramiro Parrado, Roberto Roson: Climate Change Feedback on Economic Growth: Explorations
with a Dynamic General Equilibrium Mode 
GC  44.2009  Fabio Sabatini: Does Social Capital Create Trust? Evidence from a Community of Entrepreneurs 
SD  45.2009  ZhongXiang Zhang: Is it Fair to Treat China as a Christmas Tree to Hang Everybody’s Complaints? Putting 
its Own Energy Saving into Perspective 
SD  46.2009  Eftichios S. Sartzetakis, Anastasios Xepapadeas and Emmanuel Petrakis: The Role of Information Provision 
as a Policy Instrument to Supplement Environmental Taxes: Empowering Consumers to Choose Optimally 
SD  47.2009  Jean-François Caulier, Ana Mauleon and Vincent Vannetelbosch: Contractually Stable Networks 
GC  48.2009  Massimiliano Mazzanti, Susanna Mancinelli, Giovanni Ponti and Nora Piva: Education, Reputation or 
Network?  Evidence from Italy on Migrant Workers Employability 
SD  49.2009  William Brock and Anastasios Xepapadeas: General Pattern Formation in Recursive Dynamical Systems 
Models in Economics 
SD   50.2009  Giovanni Marin and Massimiliano Mazzanti: Emissions Trends and Labour Productivity Dynamics Sector 
Analyses of De-coupling/Recoupling on a 1990-2005 Namea 
SD  51.2009  Yoshio Kamijo and Ryo Kawasaki (lxxxv): Dynamics, Stability, and Foresight in the Shapley-Scarf Housing 
Market 
IM  52.2009  Laura Poddi and Sergio Vergalli: Does Corporate Social Responsibility Affect the Performance of Firms? 
SD  53.2009  Valentina Bosetti, Carlo Carraro and Massimo Tavoni: Climate Change Mitigation Strategies in Fast-
Growing Countries:  The Benefits of Early Action 
GC  54.2009  Alireza Naghavi and Gianmarco I.P. Ottaviano: Firm Heterogeneity, Contract Enforcement, and the Industry 
Dynamics of Offshoring 
IM  55.2009  Giacomo Calzolari and Carlo Scarpa: On Regulation and Competition: Pros and Cons of a Diversified 
Monopolist 
SD  56.2009  Valentina Bosetti, Ruben Lubowski and Alexander Golub and Anil Markandya: Linking Reduced 
Deforestation and a Global Carbon Market: Impacts on Costs, Financial Flows, and Technological 
Innovation 
IM  57.2009  Emmanuel Farhi and Jean Tirole: Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch and Systemic Bailouts 
SD  58.2009  Kelly C. de Bruin and Rob B. Dellink: How Harmful are Adaptation Restrictions 
SD  59.2009  Rob Dellink, Michel den Elzen, Harry Aiking, Emmy Bergsma, Frans Berkhout, Thijs Dekker, Joyeeta Gupta: 
Sharing the Burden of Adaptation Financing: An Assessment of the Contributions of Countries 
SD  60.2009  Stefania Tonin, Anna Alberini and Margherita Turvani: The Value of Reducing Cancer Risks at Contaminated 
Sites: Are More Heavily Exposed People Willing to Pay More? 
SD  61.2009  Clara Costa Duarte, Maria A. Cunha-e-Sá and Renato Rosa: The Role of Forests as Carbon Sinks: Land-Use 
and Carbon Accounting  
GC  62.2009  Carlo Altomonte and Gabor Békés: Trade Complexity and Productivity 
GC  63.2009  Elena Bellini, Gianmarco I.P. Ottaviano, Dino Pinelli and Giovanni Prarolo: Cultural Diversity and Economic 
Performance: Evidence from European Regions 
SD 64.2009  Valentina Bosetti, Carlo Carraro, Enrica De Cian, Romain Duval, Emanuele Massetti and Massimo Tavoni: 
The Incentives to Participate in, and the Stability of, International Climate Coalitions: A Game-theoretic 
Analysis Using the Witch Model 
IM  65.2009  John Temple Lang: Article 82 EC – The Problems and The Solution 
SD  66.2009  P. Dumas and S. Hallegatte: Think Again: Higher Elasticity of Substitution Increases Economic Resilience 
SD  67.2009  Ruslana Rachel Palatnik and Roberto Roson: Climate Change Assessment and Agriculture in General 
Equilibrium Models: Alternative Modeling Strategies 
SD  68.2009  Paulo A.L.D. Nunes, Helen Ding and Anil Markandya: The Economic Valuation of Marine Ecosystems 
IM  69.2009  Andreas Madestam: Informal Finance: A Theory of Moneylenders 
SD  70.2009  Efthymia Kyriakopoulou and Anastasios Xepapadeas: Environmental Policy, Spatial Spillovers and the 
Emergence of Economic Agglomerations 
SD  71.2009  A. Markandya, S. Arnold, M. Cassinelli and T. Taylor: Coastal Zone Management in the Mediterranean: 
Legal and Economic Perspectives  
GC  72.2009  Gianmarco I.P. Ottaviano and Giovanni Prarolo: Cultural Identity and Knowledge Creation in Cosmopolitan 
Cities 
SD  73.2009  Erik Ansink: Self-enforcing Agreements on Water allocation 
GC  74.2009  Mario A. Maggioni, Francesca Gambarotto and T. Erika Uberti: Mapping the Evolution of "Clusters": A 
Meta-analysis 
SD  75.2009  Nektarios Aslanidis: Environmental Kuznets Curves for Carbon Emissions: A Critical Survey 
SD  76.2009  Joan Canton: Environmentalists' Behaviour and Environmental Policies 
SD  77.2009  Christoph M. Rheinberger: Paying for Safety: Preferences for Mortality Risk Reductions on Alpine Roads IM  78.2009  Chiara D’Alpaos, Michele Moretto, Paola Valbonesi and Sergio Vergalli: "It Is Never too late": Optimal 
Penalty for Investment Delay in Public Procurement Contracts 
SD  79.2009  Henry Tulkens and Vincent van Steenberghe: “Mitigation, Adaptation, Suffering”: In Search of the Right Mix 
in the Face of Climate Change 
SD  80.2009  Giovanni Bella: A Search Model for Joint Implementation 
SD  81.2009  ZhongXiang Zhang: Multilateral Trade Measures in a Post-2012 Climate Change Regime?: What Can Be 
Taken from the Montreal Protocol and the WTO? 
SD  82.2009  Antoine Dechezleprêtre, Matthieu Glachant, Ivan Hascic, Nick Johnstone and Yann Ménière: Invention and 
Transfer of Climate Change Mitigation Technologies on a Global Scale: A Study Drawing on Patent Data 
SD  83.2009  László Á. Kóczy: Stationary Consistent Equilibrium Coalition Structures Constitute the Recursive Core 
SD  84.2009  Luca Di Corato and Michele Moretto: Investing in Biogas: Timing, Technological Choice and the Value of 
Flexibility from Inputs Mix  
SD  85.2009  Valentina Bosetti, Enrica De Cian, Alessandra Sgobbi, and Massimo Tavoni: The 2008 WITCH Model: New 
Model Features and Baseline 
IM  86.2009  Rocco Macchiavello: Vertical Integration and Investor Protection in Developing Countries 
SD  87.2009  Massimiliano Mazzanti and Antonio Musolesi: Carbon Kuznets Curves: Long-run Structural Dynamics and 
Policy Events 
GC  88.2009  Gianmarco I.P. Ottaviano and Christian Volpe Martincus: SMEs in Argentina: Who are the Exporters 
GC  89.2009  Gianpaolo Rossini and Cecilia Vergari: Input Production Joint Venture 
SD  90.2009  Angelo Antoci, Simone Borghesi and Marcello Galeotti: Environmental Options and Technological 
Innovation: An Evolutionary Game Model 
GC  91.2009  Cristina Cattaneo: The Decision to Migrate and Social Capital: Evidence from Albania 
SD  92.2009  Valentina Bosetti and Jeffrey Frankel: Global Climate Policy Architecture and Political Feasibility: Specific 
Formulas and Emission Targets to Attain 460 ppm CO2 Concentrations 
IM  93.2009  Benno Bühler: Do International Roaming Alliances Harm Consumers? 
GC   94.2009  Elena Fumagalli and Laura Fumagalli: Like Oil and Water or Chocolate and Peanut Butter? Ethnic Diversity 
and Social Participation of Young People in England 
GC  95.2009  Olga Shurchkov: Gender Differences in Output Quality and Quantity under Competition and Time 
Constraints: Evidence from a Pilot Study 
GC  96.2009  Benedicte Apouey and Andrew E. Clark: Winning Big but Feeling no Better? The Effect of Lottery Prizes on 
Physical and Mental Health 
GC  97.2009  Giovanni Gallipoli and Laura Turner: Household Responses to Individual Shocks: Disability and Labor Supply
IM  98.2009  Felix Bierbrauer: On the Legitimacy of Coercion for the Financing of Public Goods 
IM  99.2009  Ángel L. López and Patrick Rey: Foreclosing Competition through Access Charges and Price Discrimination 
SD  100.2009  Massimo Tavoni and Bob van der Zwaan: Nuclear versus Coal plus CCS: A Comparison of Two Competitive 
Base-load Climate Control Options  







(lxxxv) This paper has been presented at the 14th Coalition Theory Network Workshop held in 
Maastricht, The Netherlands, on 23-24 January 2009 and organised by the Maastricht University CTN 
group (Department of Economics, http://www.feem-web.it/ctn/12d_maa.php). 
 